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ABSTRAK 
 
Mekanisma pemantauan yang mandatori bagi syarikat-syarikat yang tersenarai di Bursa 
Malaysia ialah audit dalaman, audit luaran dan pengarahan. Setiap satu mekanisma ini 
mempunyai kelebihan tersendiri dan saling melengkapi antara satu sama lain. Ciri-ciri 
organisasi dikatakan boleh mempengaruhi kos pemantauannya kerana kos ini adalah 
terhasil daripada sistem yang digunapakai oleh organisasi tersebut. Perkara ini adalah 
penting kerana ianya boleh memberi kesan kepada kekayaan pemegang saham 
(shareholders wealth) dan kewujudan organisasi di masa hadapan. Oleh itu, tesis ini telah 
mengkaji kesan ciri-ciri organisasi ini ke atas permintaan dan kecenderungan menyukai / 
memilih (preference) antara ketiga-tiga mekanisma pemantauan ini bagi syarikat yang 
tersenarai di Bursa Malaysia. Ciri-ciri organisasi yang dikaji adalah struktur pemilikan, 
struktur hutang, struktur sistem informasi, struktur imbuhan, status multi-nasional dan etnik. 
Keputusan kajian memberikan bukti sepertimana yang dijangkakan di dalam teori agensi, 
pemilikan pengurusan dan struktur hutang mempunyai hubungan signifikan yang negatif 
dengan kos pemantauan. Walaubagaimanapun, dapatan berkaitan pemilikan pemegang-
pemegang saham besar menunjukkan hubungan yang berbeza dengan dapatan dari kajian-
kajian di negara-negara barat. Pemegang-pemegang saham besar di Malaysia menuntut 
pemantauan yang lebih tinggi, yang mungkin disebabkan oleh keadaan perniagaan yang 
tertumpu di Malaysia. Ciri-ciri organisasi lain yang signifikan ialah status multi-nasional 
dan etnik. Kajian berkenaan kesan ciri-ciri organisasi ini ke atas kecenderungan memilih 
antara pengarahan dan pengauditan menunjukkan pemilikan pengurusan, struktur imbuhan 
dan etnik adalah signifikan. Kajian lebih mendalam berkaitan kesan ciri-ciri organisasi ini ke 
atas kecenderungan memilih audit dalaman dan audit luaran mendapati struktur hutang, 
struktur sistem informasi, status multi-nasional dan etnik adalah signifikan.  
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ABSTRACT 
 
Monitoring mechanisms that are mandatory for Malaysian public listed companies are 
internal auditing, external auditing and directorship. There is a comparative advantage of 
each type of these mechanisms and they complement each other. It is said that the 
attributes of an organisation can influence its monitoring costs, as the costs are the 
function of the systems adopted by the organisation. This is important as the costs 
involve may jeopardise the shareholders wealth and future survival of the organisation.  
Thus, this thesis investigates the impacts of these organisational attributes on the 
demands and preferences of these three monitoring mechanisms among Malaysian 
public listed companies. The organisational attributes that are examined are ownership 
structure, debt structure, information system structure, compensation structure, 
multinational status and ethnicity. The results of this study provide evidence that are 
consistent to agency theory; managerial shareholdings and debt structure appear to have 
negative significant relationships with monitoring costs. However, another ownership 
variable seems to give different finding compared to those studies in western countries.  
Block-holders appear to demand more monitoring costs, which may be due to the 
concentrated business environment in Malaysia. Other organisational attributes which 
are significant in its association with monitoring costs are multinational status and 
ethnicity. Investigation on the preference between directorship and auditing with these 
organisational attributes reveal that managerial ownership, compensation structure and 
ethnicity are significant. Further examinations on the impact of these attributes on the 
preference between internal and external auditing indicate that, debt structure, 
information system structure, multinational status and ethnicity are significant.  
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 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter comprises the background of the study.  It consists of eight sections. 
Section 1.2 presents the background and issues relating to monitoring mechanisms in 
Malaysia. Section 1.3 describes the problem statement. The research questions are stated 
in Section 1.4 and Section 1.5 presents the research objectives. Operational definitions 
for the purpose of this study are defined in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 discusses the 
significance and contributions of the study. Finally the last section explains the 
organisation of the thesis.  
 
1.2  Background of the study 
 
Governance of many companies in the world has changed dramatically, particularly in 
the wake of the East Asian financial crisis and after the recent accounting irregularities 
in the United States (Ghosh, 2007). Insufficient and malfunctioning corporate 
governance mechanisms are said to be the major factors responsible for causing and 
accelerating the deteriorating situations of the crisis (Suto, 2003; Sam, 2007). Various 
internal and external monitoring mechanisms have been suggested, and efforts are 
undertaken to improve these mechanisms.  These mechanisms are claimed to be able to 
align the interest of agents to be more closely with that of the principals (Sam, 2007). 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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